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ABORTION RIGHTS IN THE SUPREME COURT:
A TALE OF THREE WEDGES
Jennifer S. Hendricks*
In mid-May, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case designed
to overrule Roe v. Wade. 1 It’s safe to assume that six justices are inclined
to repudiate Roe, and some of those six would like to go further, declaring
a constitutional right to life that would prevent the abortion issue from
going “back to the states” at all. One of the six, Chief Justice Roberts, is
known to prefer stealth overruling of precedent, and he will likely
convince at least one other member of the majority to overrule Roe
carefully, with an eye toward the Court’s credibility and power. The
question for the next year is not whether Roe will be overruled—it already
was, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 2—but how far the Court will go.
This essay describes the arc of the Supreme Court’s abortion
jurisprudence in terms of three wedges—wedges that pry the pregnant
woman apart from first, her fetus; second, her doctor; and third, her
community. The first two wedges have each taken a turn as the primary
rationale for restricting abortion rights. Roe itself founded abortion rights
on the first wedge as a theory for restricting them: the concept of a state
interest in the fetus itself, as an entity distinct from the pregnant woman.
As public opinion shifted in support of women seeking abortions, Casey
shifted to a new rationale for restrictions: distrust of the abortion provider,
from whom the woman needed to be protected. Most recently, at least one
justice has taken an interest in anti-abortion rhetoric that drives a wedge
between the pregnant woman and her community by accusing Black
women who have abortions of participating in eugenics and genocide.
Professor Melissa Murray has argued that this last wedge may provide the

* Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School
1. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted in
part, No. 19-1392, (May 17, 2021).
2. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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extra bit of force needed to plausibly overcome stare decisis and support
the open overruling of Roe. 3
ONE
woman / fetus
The first wedge is the ultimate one when it comes to restrictions on
abortion. It is the wedge between the woman and the fetus, based on the
bio-medical concept of maternal–fetal conflict. The fundamental
argument for restricting the right to abortion is the distinct and at times
superior personhood of the fetus.
In the beginning, in Roe v. Wade, two questions were presented,
because constitutional analysis of fundamental rights always has two
steps. The first question is whether there is a fundamental right to bodily
integrity, to control of your own reproductive biology. That should have
been an easy question. Of course that’s a fundamental right. There was
clear precedent at the time about reproductive autonomy and about bodily
integrity in general.4 It was only hard in Roe because, in that case, the
question was whether women have that right independently of men. The
more difficult, second question in Roe was when that right gives way to
regulation. A woman might have all kinds of fundamental rights, but if
the state has a compelling interest in restricting them, it can. That’s true
for speech, privacy, religion, the right to bear arms—all our rights have
boundaries. The real question in Roe was whether the state had a
compelling interest that warranted restricting the woman’s rights over her
body and reproduction. The answer that the Roe Court gave was yes, once
the fetus is viable, the state can compel childbirth. 5
Why does this state interest justify such a significant intrusion on the
woman’s body? The Roe Court cited two precedents for this invasion.
First was Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 6 which recognized the state’s power
to require people to be vaccinated against smallpox. The need to protect
others outweighed the minimal intrusion. The vaccine case, however,
provided at best minimal support for state-compelled childbirth. The
burden on the woman prevented from having an abortion is much greater
3. Melissa Murray, Race-ing Roe: Reproductive Justice, Racial Justice, and the Battle for
Roe v. Wade, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2025 (2020); see also Melissa Murray, The Symbiosis of Abortion
and Precedent, 134 HARV. L. REV. 308 (2020).
4. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (adopting the “shocks the conscience test” and
finding that forced stomach pumping violated a fundamental right); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942) (striking down forced sterilization as punishment for selected crimes).
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973).
6. 197 U.S. 11 (1905), cited in Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
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than the burden on someone forced to take a vaccine. And the state’s
interest in preventing the spread of contagious disease had a long and
widely accepted history, 7 unlike the interest in potential life that was
newly formulated in Roe itself. The second precedent the Court leaned on
in Roe was more to the point, because it dealt with the state’s power to
regulate reproduction. For that principle, Roe cited Buck v. Bell. 8 You may
remember Buck v. Bell as the “three generations of imbeciles are enough”
case. That was Justice Holmes’s comment about why the State of Virginia
could forcibly sterilize Carrie Buck when it deemed her unfit to
reproduce. 9 The proof of Carrie Buck’s imbecility was a family history of
reproducing out of wedlock. Buck herself was of perfectly sound mind,
but she was the daughter of an unwed mother and had herself became an
unwed mother at a young age. 10 That, then, was the main precedent in Roe
for the state’s power to restrict abortion. The same power that lets the state
sterilize Carrie Buck because it didn’t want any potential lives that might
come from her also allows the state to force other women to childbirth if
it wants the potential lives in them.
That state interest in potential life—which in Roe and Buck could
support either the preservation or the prevention of potential life—has
come to define abortion jurisprudence, as well as the political debate over
when life begins. Even though Roe itself rejected the claim that the fetus
was a “person” under the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 it put the spotlight on
the state’s interest on the fetus as its own entity, and that debate continues
in many areas of law. State legislatures produce a steady stream of
“personhood” bills that drag abortion politics into everything from
infertility treatments to domestic violence against pregnant women to
“child abuse” prosecutions of women who fall down stairs, attempt
suicide, or get in car accidents. 12 Now that we have a Supreme Court that
is receptive to the principle of fetal personhood, states like Mississippi,
which won the cert grant in Dobbs, are passing laws intended as direct
challenges to Roe, banning abortion outright or from a very early point in
pregnancy. 13 There’s also starting to be more openness, occasionally in
7. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24–25.
8. 274 U.S. 200 (1927), cited in Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
9. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
10. See generally Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v.
Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (1985).
11. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
12. See Mary Crossley, Reproducing Dignity: Race, Disability, and Reproductive Controls, 54
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 240–44 (2020).
13. The Mississippi law at issue in Dobbs bans abortion after fifteen weeks since the woman’s
last menstrual period. Other examples include six weeks in Georgia and eighteen weeks in Utah.
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bills themselves but certainly in public rhetoric, about the desire to
criminalize and punish the woman herself, not only the doctor, for the
abortion. 14
The rhetorical severing of the pregnant woman from her fetus is the
consistent foundation for forcing women through pregnancy and birth.
But there were a couple of decades when arguments along those lines were
in retreat. Public opinion sympathized with women seeking abortions, so
anti-abortion efforts needed a different target. They chose doctors.
Proponents of anti-abortion laws cast women as the victims of abortion,
themselves as women’s protectors. That’s the second wedge—the wedge
between women and their doctors.
TWO
woman / doctor
In 1992, most observers expected the Supreme Court to use Casey to
overrule Roe. Instead, Casey reaffirmed Roe in theory while gutting it in
practice. And it did two important things to drive in the first wedge and
add a second. First, Casey consolidated the ideology of the first wedge by
authorizing an extremely narrow life and health exception. Under Casey,
after viability (and even before, when it comes to any other regulations),
a woman is entitled to survive her pregnancy with most of her organs
intact, but not much more than that. 15 Second, and most famously, Casey
lowered the standard for restrictions on abortion from “strict scrutiny” to
“undue burden.” The undue burden standard is supposed to mean that the
state cannot restrict abortion with laws that have “the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion.” 16 That is most of what we’ve been litigating about ever since
Casey—which burdens are undue in this sense?
There are two main types of burdens that states like to enact. The
first are called TRAPs, which stands for “targeted regulation of abortion
provider.” These are nitpicky rules that a state legislature passes to make
SisterSong Women of Color Reproductive Justice Collective v. Kemp, 472 F.Supp.3d 1297 (N.D. Ga.
2020) (striking down the Georgia ban); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah v. Miner, No. 2:19-CV00238 (D. Utah) (pending challenge to the Utah ban).
14. E.g., Tom Kertscher, In Context: Transcript of Donald Trump on Punishing Women for
Abortion, POLITIFACT (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.politifact.com/article/2016/mar/30/contexttranscript-donald-trump-punishing-women-ab/
15. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880; cf. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: An Historical
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 365
(1992) (describing similar laws as protecting merely “brute physical survival”).
16. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
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it more difficult and expensive to run an abortion clinic. It is one of the
main ways that access to abortion has been decimated since Casey was
decided, a sort of death-by-a-thousand-cuts harassment of abortion
clinics. The federal courts have pretty much rolled over to this kind of
regulation. Doctrinally, they do so by focusing almost entirely on
speculation about whether a particular restriction really has a “substantial”
enough “effect” on women being able to get abortions, and completely
ignoring the “purpose” part of the test. 17 The purpose of a TRAP is
transparent and obvious, but courts have insisted on simply taking the
word of the state’s lawyer, who shows up in court and says, “We’re just
trying to protect women.” Courts accept that rather than look at any actual
evidence about the purpose of the law. 18 So the litigation since Casey has
been mired in semantics over what’s “substantial,” and the right to
abortion has withered on the vine.
One interesting thing about TRAPs, of course, is that they target the
right to abortion indirectly, by targeting the provider rather than the
woman’s actual decision to have an abortion. But that’s also what makes
this a wedge. TRAPs set up the abortion provider as the suspect character
in need of regulation, so the state becomes the woman’s protector,
protecting her from her doctor. This is a real shift from Roe. Roe is well
known for its valorization of the doctor who is deciding whether to
perform an abortion. If you go back and read Roe, you may be surprised
by how much it reads as a doctor’s rights opinion not a women’s rights
opinion. 19 Casey reads much more like a women’s rights decision. 20 (It’s
not a coincidence that the decision that made abortion a question of
women’s rights rather than doctors rights is also the decision in which that
right was dramatically weakened.) By the time of Casey, we had justices,
particularly Justice Kennedy, who looked at the doctor and saw not a

17. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Undue Burdens in Texas, 127 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 145
(2014).
18. Cf. Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. _, 138 S.Ct. 2392(2018) (ignoring the president’s political
promise to impose a “Muslim ban” on immigration and accepting the government’s rationale offered
in litigation). In 2016, the Supreme Court added a cost-benefit gloss to the undue burden test,
suggesting that courts should at least weigh the purported, beneficial purpose of the law against the
burdens imposed on women, although it stopped short of holding that an improper purpose would
result in the law being struck down. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. _, 136 S.Ct.
2292 (2016).
19. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (“[F]or the period of pregnancy prior to this ‘compelling’
point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation
by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.”).
20. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895–98 (striking down a husband-notification requirement because
the state “may not give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over their
children”).
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respected professional but an “abortionist” 21 who couldn’t be trusted. In
essence, the price of “saving” Roe in Casey was that someone would
replace the doctor as the paternalistic overseer of the woman’s decision,
and that someone was the state.
This new adversariness between the woman and the doctor becomes
even more explicit in another kind of regulation, where the state interferes
directly with the decision-making process about whether to have an
abortion at all. Sometimes the state interferes by giving some third party
the right to participate—as with parental consent laws (which have mostly
been upheld, as long as there’s judicial bypass) or husband/biological
father consent laws (which so far have been struck down). 22 But the state
also inserts itself into the decision through what it calls informed consent.
In their most extreme forms, these are the laws which force women to
have medically unnecessary ultrasounds and listen to anti-abortion
propaganda before they are allowed to have an abortion—usually with a
waiting period thrown in to make it more difficult. In these situations, it
is clear that what the state is “protecting” the woman from is the abortion
itself. The state is not regulating the safety of a medical facility or
protecting the woman’s autonomy through informed consent. It is trying
to dissuade her from having an abortion because the abortion will be bad
for her and she will eventually regret it. 23
All of these supposedly woman-protective arguments for abortion set
up the abortion provider as the enemy, the person from whom the woman
needs to be protected. That characterization is coming to its fruition in an
argument that a few members of the Supreme Court have started to
encourage parties to serve up, which is that abortion providers lack
standing to challenge abortion restrictions because they have a “blatant
conflict of interest” with their patients.24 The doctors and clinics, on this
view, are just raking in money from abortions, preying on women in the
process. In any other context, this argument against standing would be
rightfully dismissed out of hand. It’s well established that the business
providing a service can assert the rights of the customer seeking the

21. Justice Kennedy’s dissent in the first “partial-birth abortion” case, Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914 (2000), used the word abortionist thirteen times.
22. Casey, 505 U.S. at 899 (parental consent), 895–98 (spousal notification).
23. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (expressly permitting regulations that “create a structural
mechanism by which the State . . . may express profound respect for the life of the unborn”); see also
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (justifying restrictions on abortions on the grounds
that women might regret having them).
24. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 591 U.S. _, 140 S.Ct. 2013, 2153 (2020) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
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service, 25 and making an exception to that for abortion is absurd—unless
you see the woman’s decision to have an abortion as inherently suspect
and wrong and therefore the abortion provider as a sort of evil, coercive
figure. Which is how a majority of the Supreme Court now sees it.
If this argument succeeds, it will be a body blow to the usual
litigation strategy for protecting abortion rights. A glance through the
names of the important abortion cases in the Supreme Court over the last
50 years reveals that the vast majority have been brought by abortion
providers—mostly Planned Parenthood—only occasionally by individual
women; Roe itself was exceptional in that way. I confess, I see a silver
lining when it comes to this wedge. Even as the rhetoric around abortion
shifted from doctors’ rights to women’s rights, the doctors took over the
litigation program, which in my view has done real harm to the side. For
example, the issue of “partial-birth abortion” was litigated as a fight
between Justices Breyer and Kennedy over whether the doctor or the
legislature, respectively, should decide what kind of abortion a woman
should have. 26 The loss of third-party standing would require a strategic
overhaul, and perhaps control over abortion litigation would shift a bit
away from medical providers and back toward feminist activists. The
standing issue may, however, be moot if a majority of the Court believes
it is politically feasible to repudiate Roe entirely next year.
THREE
woman / community
That brings us to the third wedge, between the woman and her
community. As Professor Murray has powerfully demonstrated, this looks
like the wedge of the future. 27 It starts with trait-selection laws. These are
laws that prohibit abortion for particular reasons. The first and most
common ones are prohibitions on abortion for the purpose of sex selection
or because of a genetic anomaly in the fetus. We know people have
abortions for these reasons—probably very few for sex-selection, but
more for genetic anomalies, which are widely considered a legitimate
reason for abortion, among those in the habit of passing judgment.

25. See Elika Nassirinia, Third-Party Standing and Abortion Providers: The Hidden Dangers
of June Medical Services, 16 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 214 (2021).
26. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right to
Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 370 (2010) (“Not until Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in
Carhart II was there any suggestion that the pregnant woman might be an appropriate decisionmaker.”).
27. Murray, supra note 3, at 2040–41.
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Trait-selection laws represent a step away from the idea of the
woman as the victim of abortion and move her back into the perpetrator
role. With these laws, it’s actually the doctor who is supposed to be the
front-line enforcer, refusing to perform the abortion if the woman’s reason
is illegitimate. Trait-selection laws also incorporate a kind of personhood
argument. They cast the fetus as the person it could become and make an
implicit argument about discrimination against that sort of potential future
person. Thus, part of the power of trait-selection laws is that they appeal
to left/liberal concerns about social justice, sex and disability
discrimination, and how those relate to abortion. They invite observers to
make the critical error of conflating two questions: (1) what do I think are
good reasons for having an abortion? and (2) when should the state force
women through pregnancy and childbirth?
Recently, the Supreme Court’s attention was briefly turned to a traitselection law that adds one more prohibited basis for abortion. In addition
to sex and disability, laws in a few states prohibit abortion because of the
fetus’s race. One of those states was Indiana. Its trait-selection law was
struck down by the Seventh Circuit, and the Supreme Court ultimately
denied review, but Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence highlighting the
question of race-selection in abortion as one the Court must soon face. 28
We’re used to hearing traits like race, sex, and disability grouped
together in discrimination law, but pause and notice what is odd in this
context. What is the scenario that the Indiana legislature is imagining, in
which a woman considers race as a factor in deciding to have an abortion?
One might imagine a scenario in which a White woman decides to abort
because she got pregnant with a Black man. For example, a White lesbian
couple recently sued a fertility clinic for giving them the wrong sperm.
Specifically, they had selected a White sperm donor but were given sperm
from a Black donor. Most of their claimed damages flowed from the racial
aspect of the error—that they and their daughter would now have to
contend with racism in their lives—rather than any of the other
characteristics for which they may have selected one donor over another.29
One could imagine that, if the error had been discovered early, the woman
who was pregnant might have decided to have an abortion and try again.
Under Indiana’s trait-selection law, that abortion would presumably have
been illegal.

28. Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. and Ky., Inc., 587 U.S. _, 139 S.Ct. 1780, 1782 (2019).
29. Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank, LLC, No. 2014-L-010159 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 29, 2014),
2014 WL 4853400. See generally Camille Gear Rich, Contracting Our Way to Inequality: Race,
Reproductive Freedom and the Quest for the Perfect Child, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2375 (2020).
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This unusual case, however, is not what trait-selection laws are
about. Including race in trait-selection laws is a way of invoking a
narrative that abortion is a kind of eugenics—specifically, that abortion is
“Black genocide.” What that means is that these laws are aimed at Black
women—not in a very practical way, but the point is to accuse Black
women of participating in eugenics and genocide against the Black
community for having abortions. This narrative has been around for a long
time. As Professor Murray elucidates, it has a history in the anti-abortion
movement but also in the more male-oriented civil rights groups, with, for
example, some Black Panthers embracing the argument that White
society, by allowing Black women to have abortions, was targeting and
trying to eliminate the Black community. 30 This is an argument that
Justice Thomas has invited states to make in the future as a justification
for overturning Roe and banning abortion.
This argument picks up on and co-opts arguments from the feminist
left, in this case from the reproductive justice movement. “Reproductive
justice” is a concept that includes reproductive rights as lawyers
traditionally think of them in law but also a much broader struggle against
reproductive oppression. 31 It comes out of the experience and activism of
Black women, who among many other concerns have argued that the
large, White-dominated feminist organizations put too much emphasis on
abortion and contraception and not enough on other forms of reproductive
oppression—forced sterilization, environmental racism that leads to
infertility, poverty and state-sponsored violence that interfere with being
able to raise children with dignity, and family separation policies aimed
at children of color. All of those aspects of reproductive justice, and
reproductive oppression, contribute to why Black women
disproportionately have abortions, and there is no question that the
movements for contraception and abortion rights were racist; indeed, the
head of Planned Parenthood recently published an opinion piece in the
New York Times titled, “We’re Done Making Excuses for Our Founder.” 32
But what Justice Thomas and others who put this argument forward do is
put the blame not on Margaret Sanger and her ilk but on the Black woman
seeking the abortion, the woman who is coping with all of that oppression
30. Murray, supra note 3, at 2041–45.
31. See generally Zakiya Luna & Kristin Luker, Reproductive Justice, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 327 (2014); Dorothy Roberts, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 308–12 (2d ed. 2017) (setting out an agenda for incorporating reproductive
justice priorities into the legal system’s understanding of reproductive liberty).
32. Alexis McGill Johnson, I’m the Head of Planned Parenthood. We’re Done Making
Excuses for Our Founder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/17/
opinion/planned-parenthood-margaret-sanger.html.
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and making the best decision that she can see for herself and her family.
They’re blaming her and calling her the eugenicist.
Where is that argument going? It doesn’t really have much to do with
trait-selection laws. Rather, as Professor Murray powerfully warns, it is a
frontal attack of Roe as irretrievably tainted by eugenics, so that it can be
overruled as the product of a racist program, a modern-day Dred Scott. 33
And be clear. The end-game here is not just to overrule Roe in the sense
many people continue to naively assume, where abortion gets “sent back
to the states.” Abortion has already been sent back to the states; Casey and
the undue burden test did that. The trajectory of this argument is not just
to overrule Roe but to establish a right to life for the fetus, superior to the
rights of the pregnant woman, not through a constitutional amendment but
through a Supreme Court decision, so that the Supreme Court would rule
not just that abortion is unprotected but that it is, in fact, constitutionally
prohibited everywhere in the U.S. 34
Conclusion
Justice Breyer should announce his retirement immediately. 35

33. Murray, supra note 3, at 2071–88.
34. The easiest path for preventing states from allowing abortion would be for the Supreme
Court to declare that fetuses are “persons” and that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause for
states to exclude abortion from criminal homicide laws. See, e.g., Charles I. Lugosi, Conforming to
the Rule of Law: When Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same Thing in Fourteenth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 4 GEO. J.L. & POL’Y 361, 364–65 (2006) (“The Fourteenth Amendment
would thereafter prohibit abortion in every state.”).
35. See Paul F. Campos, Justice Breyer Should Retire Right Now, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/15/opinion/stephen-breyer-supreme-court.html (“At the moment,
no fewer than six Democratic senators over the age of 70 represent states where a Republican
governor would be free to replace them with a Republican, should a vacancy occur.”)

